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Lease Law*
Richard D. Moreno-

I. SHERIFF'S EXECUTION OF WRIT OF POSSESSION AND

OTHER EVICTION ISSUES

A city marshal recently posed the following question to the Attorney General's
Office for an opinion: "When a city marshal, pursuant to the provisions of
[Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure] Art. 4734, gives the lessor possession of his
premises, should the furniture and other goods be carried to neutral ground, even
though it may be several hundred feet away, or is it legal to set the goods in front
of the apartment still being on lessor's property, but out of the dwelling?"'
The Attorney General responded that he appreciated that because of the size
of some apartment complexes, the marshal or constable may find it difficult to
move the contents of an apartment to the nearest neutral ground, apparently because
of the distance to the nearest neutral ground. The Attorney General concluded,
however, that to statutorily carry out the duty imposed by Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure articles 4733 and 4734, the marshal, constable, or sheriff must return all
buildings and land to the lessor, allowing him possession of same. In making this
determination, the Attorney General's Office relied upon Article 4704, which states
that "premises" includes the "land and all buildings and improvements thereon
leased by a tenant, or possessed by an occupant." The Attorney General further
concluded that if the sheriff only removed the lessee's property to another part of
the lessor's property, it is possible the lessor might be subject to some liability to
the lessee for damages to or loss of the property.
Although it is well established that the Attorney General's opinions are not
binding authority, 2 the analysis the Attorney General employs is troubling to the
extent it contradicts the recent holding of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Potter
v. FirstFederalSavings & Loan Ass'n,2 which held the lessor's premises does not
necessarily include common areas, but rather includes only those areas which the
lessee has exclusive possession. The analysis employed in the Attorney General
opinion may place at issue whether the definition of "premises," as used in
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 4704 and Louisiana Civil Code article
2703, are identical or represent different definitions founded in different purposes.4
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On the other hand, the Attorney General's opinion may be viewed merely as
an incorrect interpretation of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 4704. As
the Attorney General noted, Article 4704 states that "premises" includes the "land
and all buildings and improvements thereon leasedby a tenant,orpossessed by an
occupant." Yet, the Attorney General's opinion gives little meaning to the
emphasized language. As Potterteaches, the extent of the premises is measured
by the exclusive control of the tenant. Application of the Potter definition of
premises suggests that the evicting sheriff or marshall need only restore to the
landlord that portion of the apartment complex "leased by a tenant, or possessed by
an occupant." Although such a construction would be less satisfactory to the
landlord, it harmonizes the Potter definition of premises. This construction also
emphasizes a practical problem associated with leases of apartments in large
complexes, a matter less common in 1870. However, it also portends an absurd
situation if a court were to apply the Potterdefinition strictly in an eviction of a*
tenant of a room let in a house. It seems unlikely that Potterdeems eviction into
the hallway sufficient. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the Potter premises
extends beyond the tenant's doorway.
The answer to that question may also bear upon the troubling practice in some
jurisdictions of requiring the evicting landlord to provide necessary labor to move
the tenant's possessions from the premises. The same reasoning that supports the
Attorney General's opinion on the submitted question militates in favor of a rule
of law that requires the sheriff or marshal to physically return the premises to the
lessor.

II.

POTTER V.FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASS'N--CONTINUING TO DEFINE

THE PREMISES
Confusion about the distinction made in Potterbetween "the premises" and
common areas continues either to trouble courts or to be overlooked. In Boteler v.
Lake Management, Inc.,6 the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal held
Louisiana Civil Code article 2703 inapplicable, where one tenant of an apartment
complex was murdered by another tenant ofthe apartment. The court reasoned that
the murderer was a residentof the complex and not a third person claiming no right
to the premises. According to the court's analysis, absent eviction, the murderer
had a right to the premises as a tenant.'
This analysis is not in accord with the holding by the Louisiana Supreme Court
in Potter. Potteridentified "the premises" as that area over which the tenant has
exclusive control. The Pottercourt strongly differentiated between the premises
and common areas. These two distinctive areas are defined with reference to the

5. (emphasis added).
6.
7.

628 So. 2d 86 (La. App. 5th Cir, 1993).
Id. at 87.
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lease. The murder in Boteler occurred in a parking lot, a common area. Thus, in
light of Potter, the Boteler court correctly concluded that Article 2703 was
inapplicable, but for the wrong reason. Article 2703 did not apply because the
murderer was not a trespasser to the Potterpremises, that over which the victim had
exclusive control. Thus, the Potternegligence analysis was applicable.
III. LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE ERROR IN RELATION TO LEASES
A. Errorthat Terminatesa Lease
In Baro Controls, Inc. v. Prejean,9 the court opined as to whether an alleged
rotten beam constituted a defect sufficient to rise to the level of error or vice of
consent to a purchase option contract on the leased premises. The court concluded
it was not, although its statement of the law of error lacked precision.
In an incorrect statement of the law, the court stated "the error must be as to
the principal cause for making the contract."'0 Further, the court noted that the
person alleging error must prove that the obligation undertaken would not have
been incurred by a reasonable person who knew of the particular defective
condition. However, Article 1949 of the 1984 law of obligations revision to the
Louisiana Civil Code states that "error vitiates consent only when it concerns a
cause without which the obligation would not have been incurred."" Comment
(e) accompanying Article 1949 provides in part that "even when an obligation has
multiple causes, error that bears on any one of them is sufficient to make the
obligation invalid."' 2 That misstatement notwithstanding, the court concluded that
"Prejean failed to establish that the defect was of such a nature that she would not
have purchased the option had she known of the condition" prior to the date of the
original option contract.' 3 Thus, although the court may have misspoke as to the
proper legal test for determination of error sufficient to vitiate consent, its
conclusion that Prejean failed to meet the second prong of the test mooted the
necessity to examine the error of cause issue.
B. Errorthat Revives a Lease
In an unusual case, Boardof Commissioners v. Turner MarineBulk, Inc., 4
a lessee that had terminated a lease argued duress vitiated his act of termination
and, in effect, revived the lease. The termination arose when the lessee failed

8.
(1994).
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Richard D. Moreno. Developments in Lease Law 1992-1993, 54 La. L. Rev. 1237, 1237-38
634 So. 2d 46 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994).
Id. at 48.
(emphasis added).
La. Civ. Code art.
1949 cmt. (e).
Baro Controls, Inc., 634 So. 2d at 48.
629 So. 2d 1278 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993), writ denied, 634 So. 2d 392 (1994).
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to gain access to insurance proceeds paid to the lessor for damage to the leased
premises. On that issue, the court found the clear and unambiguous language of
the lease shifted the risk of loss to the lessee while providing insurance coverage
for such loss to the lessor. Regarding those insurance proceeds, the lease only
required the lessor to make insurance proceeds available to the lessee as progress
payments when the lessee repaired the insured loss or damage to the premises. 5
In February, 1992, a storm damaged a shiploader, a piece of heavy
equipment necessary for the operation of the leased bulk terminal. The lessor
dock board owned the damaged shiploader. The lessee claimed to be financially
unable to repair the shiploader without access to the insurance proceeds paid to
the lessor. Thus, exercising a provision that gave the lessee the right to cancel
the lease by giving the board notice within thirty days of the occurrence of
damage rendering the leased premises substantially unfit, the lessee terminated
6
the lease.'
The lessee, however, continued to occupy the premises without paying rent.
After some period, the dock board issued a notice to vacate. Shortly thereafter,
the board sent a notice of default. The lessee then filed suit seeking enforcement
of the lease by specific performance and injunction. Concurrent with the filing
of the suit, the lessee deposited all back rents in the registry of the court.
Shortly thereafter, the board filed a rule to evict. Without denying it had sent
a letter of termination of the lease in March, 1992, and without denying it had
failed to vacate the premises or to pay rent, the lessee urged that the termination
letter of March, 1992, resulted from economic duress. The lessee argued it could
not reconstruct the damaged premises without advance payment of the insurance
funds paid to the lessor. As a result, the lessee argued, it had the right to rescind
its letter of termination and to enforce the lease. 7 The claim of duress
.notwithstanding, the court concluded the lessee opted to cancel the lease based
upon its own financial condition and upon its evaluation of the lease. Thus, the
court found the lessee did not terminate the lease because of the economic duress
caused by the dock board. The lessee had simply entered into a "bad bargain,"
and it was not the province of the courts to release the lessee."8
In an interesting obiter dictum, the court opined whether the lessee's claimed
duress constituted economic duress within the meaning of the Louisiana Civil
Code. It concluded that the rightful refusal to turn over insurance proceeds to
the lessee until there was a claim for progress payment, as the lease required, did
not constitute duress. The court noted that Louisiana Civil Code article 1959
pertains to the type of duress that causes an invalid manifestation of assent to the
creation of a contract.' 9 Thus, the court opined, neither Article 1959 nor case

15. Id. at 1279-80. Cf.Edwards v. Conforto, 636 So. 2d 901 (La. 1993).
16. Board of Comnnt'rs, 629 So. 2d at 1278-79.
17. Id. at 1279.
18. Id. at 1282.
19. Id. at 1281-83. See also George M. Armstrong, Jr., Louisiana Landlord and Tenant Law
§ 2.63, at 37-6 to -7(1994).
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law thereunder is controlling as to what procedures or remedies a court should
employ where a party claims
that a contract, such as the lease herein, had been
20
terminated under duress.
IV. BROKER'S COMMISSIONS

In Begue v. Cahn,2' a preprinted lease contained the following language:
Lessor, its heirs, successors or assigns, agrees to pay [broker], its
heirs, successors or assigns a cash commission of 6% on the total rental
(Minimum guaranteed rental as well as additional sales percentage

rental,if any) of this lease up to $200,000 and a similar commission on
any extension or renewal.22
The lease was a ninety-six-month lease. The broker collected commissions
on rental payments each month by withholding her commission from the rent and
forwarding the remainder to the lessor. Prior to the end of the term of the lease,
to the dismay of the broker, the lessor sold the property. The broker then
demanded full payment of the commission due through the end of the lease term.
When the lessor refused, the broker filed suit contending commissions were due
and payable in a lump sum at the time the lease was signed. She argued that
acceptance of monthly payment of commissions merely reflected a courtesy to
the lessor.23
With a view toward commercial realities, the court analyzed the potential
consequences of such a claim. Reviewing the lease agreement, the Begue court
concluded such a lease
could just as easily have been for twenty or thirty years in which case
the landlord would have to pay commissions up front in an amount
equal to one, two, or more years rent without yet having received any
rent to fund such a large cash outlay, with no guarantee that the lessee
were to faithfully make all payments required under the lease for the
term of the lease. 4
Recognizing the problem inherent in that circumstance, the court concluded such
a result would not be workable in normal marketplace conditions, especially
where the tenant is not a national entity. Viewing another potential problem, the
court reasoned that if the lease contained an "additional sales percentage rental"
as part of the total rental, it would be impossible to calculate the sales percentage

20. Board of Comm'rs, 629 So. 2d at 1283 (citing Wilson v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 228
So. 2d 229 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969)).
21. 617 So. 2d 961 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 620 So. 2d 845 (1993).
22. Id. at 962. See also Armstrong, supra note 19, § 4.7, at 98-99.
23. Begue, 617 So. 2d at 962.
24. Id.
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rental until one knows the amount of the sales. In sum, the court concluded the
broker's contention of lump sum, up-front payment of all commissions was not
well founded in logic or common sense.25 Absent an express agreement, the
broker was not entitled to a lump sum, up-front commission. In addition, the
court looked to the performance of the contract to determine the intent of an
ambiguous provision.26 Noting that the commission broker accepted monthly
commission payments for over three and one-half years while she was collecting
the rentals, the court found evidence of performance that tended to prove the
27
parties' intent to have monthly remittances.
In considering the remedies available to the broker, the court further noted
there was no express provision in the lease that entitled the broker to accelerate
the commissions when the property was sold, or for any other reason. By
implication, the broker's commission payments became due on a month-to-month
basis. The broker urged that such a conclusion would require a new suit every
month to collect the commissions, a burden so onerous as to constitute
irreparable injury. The court noted that although the broker may have to go to
court to enforce her claims, this does not constitute irreparable injury. Further,
the court found no evidence in the record to support the contention that she
would never again be paid her monthly commissions voluntarily. Finally, the
court noted that should the broker not be paid for her commissions when due,
she would be entitled to interest to compensate her for the delay. 28
V. GOVERNMENTAL INTERFERENCE WITH A LEASE AND ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO
CANCEL A LEASE

In Bostick v. Wood,29 the court interpreted a lease provision which stated:
If ... any governmental agency interferes with the Lessee's use of
the premises as contemplated by this Lease Agreement, then Lessee
may, at its option, terminate the Lease Agreement or any part thereof
30
and receive a prorata refund of any rental payment hereunder.
The lessee of a boat mooring operation received notice from the Army Corps of
Engineers that it intended to construct a revetment adjacent to the mooring
operations. The construction of the revetment would only affect the mooring
operations 'of the lessee for a few days. However, after the revetment was
complete, the lessee could not conduct mooring operations without building
structures to keep the barges off the banks. Testimony indicated such structures

25.
La. 757,
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 963 (citing Wanless v. Smith, 248 So. 2d 343 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 259
252 So. 2d 455 (1971)).
La. Civ. Code at. 2053.
Begue, 617 So. 2d at 963.
Id. at 963-64.
620 So. 2d 297 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 627 So. 2d 661 (1993).
Id. at 298. See also Armstrong, supra note 19, § 5.41, at 108-09.
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would cost approximately $270,000. Alleging these facts constituted governmental interference, the lessee opted to cancel the lease under the quoted provision.
The lessor brought an action against the lessee for damages resulting from
termination of the lease. The lessor argued he should have had a right to have
a reasonable opportunity to cure the disturbance.31
The court found the termination provision of the lease to be clear and
unambiguous, stating:
it would be a contradiction in terms to grant an absolute right under
certain conditions and then, when those conditions arose, to compel the
party possessing that right to pay toll in order to avoid the necessity of
exercising it.32
The court concluded it would be similarly contradictory to grant the lessee an
absolute right to cancel and then to compel the lessee to afford the lessor the
opportunity to correct whatever problem triggered the right of termination. The
court reaffirmed that there is no express or implied prohibition in law against a
termination option such as that appearing in the instant lease. Nor was there any
showing that the provision is against public good or policy. Furthermore, the
court noted the particular option to cancel only affected the rights of the lessor
and the lessee and not the rights of third parties, In an interesting aside, the
court noted the particular governmental interference occurred at a time in which
the lessee had not made use of the leased premises for eighteen months
immediately prior to the interference. Nevertheless, the court concluded that if
the circumstances of the case justified abandonment of the premises, the motives
for exercising that legal right did not affect the situation.33
VI.

DISTURBANCE OF PEACEABLE POSSESSION BY SEIZURE UNDER WRIT OF
SEIZURE AND SALE

In Union Bank v. CotonportInsurance Exchange,34 the issue arose whether
a petition for executory process and matters associated therewith constituted a
disturbance of peaceable possession sufficient for the lessee to consider the lease
terminated. 35 The bank held a promissory note executed by Avoyelles
Insurance Agency (Avoyelles) and secured by a mortgage on an office building.
Avoyelles leased the office building to Cottonport Insurance Exchange
(Cottonport) for a three-year term. The mortgage was superior to the lease.
When Avoyelles defaulted on the note during the term of the lease, the bank
filed a petition for executory process to enforce the mortgage. The court entered

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Bostick, 620 So. 2d at 297-98.
Id. at 300 (quoting Texas & P. Ry. v. Mengel Co., 62 F. Supp. 752, 756 (ED. La. 1945)).
Id. at 300-01 (citing Dean v. Beck, 46 La. Ann. 1168, 15 So. 357 (1894)).
630 So. 2d 975 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 637 So. 2d 1049 (1994).
See also Armstrong, supra note 19, § 5.84. at 121-22.
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an order permitting the seizure and sale of the office. When made aware of the
order of seizure and sale, the lessee believed the building could. be seized and
sold at any time, and thus, vacated the building and moved the offices to another
location. At the same time, Cottonport discontinued payment of the monthly
rent.36
In fact, after invoking executory process, the bank did nothing to the
property except make an inventory of the property and take measurements of the
office building. After Cottonport abandoned the premises, the bank entered into
a dation en paiment with Avoyelles, the mortgagee, which allowed a transfer of
the building, along with the interest in the lease, to the bank in satisfaction of the
mortgage. The bank then sued Cottonport to enforce the lease and to collect past
due rent and future rent due under the acceleration clause. Cottonport defended
by claiming that the threat of seizure of the property disturbed its peaceful
possession.37
The court noted:
[A] lessor suing for rent due under a lease must exercise care in
executing a writ of seizure so that the lessee's possession is not
unnecessarily disturbed. A lessor has breached its obligation to
maintainihe lessee in peaceable possession if a disturbance is such that
the lessee can no longer use the premises for the purposes intended.38
The court noted no actual seizure took place. The bank never denied Cottonport
access to the building, nor told Cottonport to vacate the premise. A sheriffs
deputy visited the leased premises only for periods of approximately fifteen to
thirty minutes on two occasions. The court then noted the basic principle that
"[a] necessary temporary or insignificant disturbance is not grounds for the
abrogation of a lease. 39 The court concluded the bank never prevented
Cottonport from using the premises for its intended purpose. Moreover,
Cottonport vacated the building by its own choice. As a result, the court found
Cottonport breached the lease agreement when it ceased paying rent.4
Compare the argument in Union Bank with the argument that an eviction suit
constitutes a disturbance of possession of the lessee within the meaning of the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3663, which earned an attorney the
imposition of sanctions under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 863."

36.
37.
38.

Union Bank, 630 So. 2d at 976.
Id.
Id. at 977 (citing Henry Rose Mercantile & Mfg. Co. v. Stearns, 154 La. 946, 98 So. 429

(1923)).
39. Id.(citing Friendly Fin. v.Cefalu Realty Inv., Inc., 278 So. 2d 584 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ
refised, 281 So. 2d 747 (1973)).
.40.

Id

41.

Jackson v. Campco of Monroe, Inc., 623 So. 2d 1380 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993).
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VII. INTERPRETATION OF LEASE PROVISIONS CONCERNING FORM OR METHOD

OF NOTICE42
In Board of Commissionersv. Turner Marine Bulk, Inc.,4 the lease required
all notices be given by certified or registered mail. The resolution of the noticerelated issues on appeal is instructive for both lessors and lessees. The lessor sent
a notice by regular mail notifying the lessee that he was behind in payment of the
rent. The lessee acknowledged receipt of the letter by replying to the lessor a few
days later. On appeal, the lessee urged that the lessor had sent the notice of arrears
in rent in a manner other than by certified or registered mail as required by the
lease."
Rejecting the claim, the court noted the purpose of a requirement that notice
be given by certified or registered mail is to insure receipt. Thus, where the party
to be notified does not contest receipt, the failure to use the agreed method of
notice, here certified or registered mail, does not invalidate notice actually received.
Thus, the court concluded that where adequate notice is given and its receipt is not
contested, later challenges to the technicalities of form of notice will be unavailing.
Finally, reviewing the in-arrears letter for adequacy, the court noted that it stated
"this rent is due and payable as well as any overrides .... or lay up charges due in
accordance with ...the lease., 45 The lessee protested that the in-arrears letter
made no demand for payment or threat of action for continued non-payment of rent.
The court noted the lease only required notice of non-payment and not that the
notice of non-payment contain any special language. The lease did not require a
demand for payment nor did it require a threat that there be consequences for nonpayment. Nor, as the court noted, is there such requirement in law.
Thus, the in6
arrears letter provided adequate notice of non-payment of rent.
VIII. PROOF OF PREMISES DEFECT

A. Absence of UnreasonableRisk of Harm
In some instances, whether a condition of the premises constitutes a defect
becomes mooted by a finding that under Louisiana's duty/risk analysis the "defect"
did not constitute an unreasonable risk of harm. For example, in a recent case, the
court affirmed ajury finding of absence of negligence where the evidence showed
that the child somehow fell out of a window, which was approximately fourteen
inches above the floor.4 The evidence indicated that the screen may not have fit

42. See also Armstrong, supra note 19, § 2.55. at 37-1 to -2.
43. See supra text
accompanying notes 14-20.
44. Board of Comm'rs v. Turner Marine Bulk, Inc., 629 So. 2d 1278, 1283 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1993), writ denied, 634 So. 2d 392 (1994).
45. Id.at 1284.

46.

id.

47.

Fisher v. River Oaks, Ltd., 635 So. 2d 1209 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 637 So. 2d
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the frame of the window tightly. However, there was no evidence as to how the
child fell, even though there were two other children who witnessed the accident.
Accepting the jury's choice between a plaintiffs expert and a defendant's expert
who expressed opposing opinions as to whether the window installation constituted
an unreasonable risk of harm, the appellate court affirmed the jury's decision as
reasonable in light of the evidence.48
B. Inadequate Versus Broken Locks
In Veazey v. Elmwood PlantationAssociates, Ltd.," the petition alleged that
the lessor "was negligent in providing inadequate locks on the windows in the
apartment." 50 There were no allegations that "the locks were broken and/or in
need of repair."'" The court observed that Louisiana Civil Code article 2716
provides:
The repairs, which must be made at the expense of the tenant, are those
which, during the lease, it becomes necessary to make: To windows,
shutters, partitions, shop windows, locks and hinges, and everything of
that kind, according to the custom of the place. 2
Construing the ordinary meaning of the word "repair" as to "restore to sound
condition after damage or injury," the court concluded that an allegation of
negligent provision of inadequate locks on the windows did not state a cause of
action within the scope of Article 2716.11 Thus, the question whether the landlord
owed a duty to provide adequate locks and whether the locks in question were
adequate necessarily required a duty-risk analysis under Article 2315.
IX. PRE-LEASE ORAL MISREPRESENTATION OF PREMISES SECURrrY

In Veazey, the court held that an allegation of pre-lease misrepresentation of
the amount of security alleged fraud under Louisiana Civil Code article 1953.
Proof of a vice of consent is an exception to the parol evidence rule; hence, parol
evidence is admissible to prove that vice of consent under Louisiana Civil Code
article 1848. Thus, the court concluded that testimony concerning oral promises
of security made prior to the execution of a written lease was properly admitted into
evidence."'

503 (1994).
48. Id. at 1215-16.
49. 625 So. 2d 675 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1993), affd, 646 So. 2d 866 (1994).
50. Id. at 678.
51. Id.

52.

Id. (quoting La. Civ. Code art. 2716).

53.
54.

Id.
Id. at 677-78.
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X. COMPARATIVE FAULT OF TENANT OR THIRD PERSONS

An important issue under Louisiana's comparative fault system is whether
fault may or must be assessed between an unknown third party intentional
tortfeasor (a rapist) and a negligent landlord. In Veazey, the court held that
although Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1812 allows a special written
question assessing the degree of fault between an intentional and a negligent
tortfeasor to be submitted to the jury, the trial court has wide discretion,
including the right to omit such a jury charge."5
In Smith v. Jack Dyer & Associates, Inc.,36 the lessor argued that the lessee

and his third party guest should be found comparatively negligent for injuries
suffered when the guest tripped on a carpet buckle while coming down the stairs
of the leased premises. The lessee admitted he had knowledge of the carpet
buckle and he did not attempt any repairs. The lessee further admitted he did
not tell the lessor about the carpet buckle on the staircase. He testified he did
not attempt to make any repairs because he is not a carpet repairman and would
not know how to repair carpet. Instead, the lessee notified the management of
the carpet buckle so the management could make the necessary repairs.3
The court concluded that although the lessee had knowledge of the defect,
the lessee did not have knowledge that the carpet buckle posed a dangerous
condition which necessitated the lessee to warn his guests. On that basis, the
court sustained the finding of the trial court that the lessee was not negligent.
The court also held that the act of descending stairs naturally requires a person
to exercise a greater degree of care than is called for when walking on a level
surface. Nonetheless, the court reiterated that the law does not require a person
descending stairs to meticulously devote the entirety of his attention to the
surface below in an effort to scan for hidden defects. The court found the victim
was using the staircase in the manner for which it was intended at the time of
the accident. Further, the victim was not familiar with the staircase and was not
aware of the carpet buckle. The court concluded the victim's failure to8 notice
the carpet buckle did not warrant a finding of comparative negligence.
XI. OYSTER LEASES
A. Constitutionaland Statutory Challenges
In Jurisich v. Hopson Marine Service Co.," the court compared, in dicta,

the nature of a lease granting the right to harvest live oysters from state water
55.
56.

Id. at 678-79.
633 So. 2d 694 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993).

57.
58.

Id. at 696.
Id. at 699-700.

59. 619 So. 2d 1111 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993). See also Armstrong, supra note 19, § 1.3A. at
11-0 to -2.
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bottoms with a shell dredging lease. In addition, the court examined a number
of other issues unique to leases of state property.
One claim urged that the oyster harvesting lease was invalid because of the
state's failure to follow public bid laws in awarding the lease,' citing Sierra
Club v. Louisiana Department of Wildlife & Fisheries.6' Sierra Club held
public bid law applied to the granting of the shell dredging leases, a type of lease
granting the right to take fossil clam and oyster shell deposits from state-owned
water bottoms6-a mineral right as defined in Article 4 of the Mineral
Code. 6' Although forced to acknowledge the inevitable fact that when live
oysters are harvested, oyster shells are also necessarily taken, the Jurisich court
refused to equate live oyster harvesting with shell dredging. Rather, it concluded
the attempt to classify a marine invertebrate as. a mineral was an argument
without merit. Further, construing statutes in parimateria evidenced that public
bid laws are not relevant to live oyster harvest leases. The court first noted the
Department of Wildlife and Fisheries has an express statutory power to grant
leases on state-owned water bottoms for oyster cultivation, bedding, and
harvesting. Then it observed a specific statutory exemption of leases relative of
wildlife, fisheries, and timber from public bid law. Thus, when the express
power to grant the live oyster harvesting lease is viewed in light of the express
exemption from public bid law, the court concluded that leases for live oyster
harvesting from state-owned waterbeds did not require compliance with the
public bid law for validity.6
Another argument for invalidity was that the lease was, in effect, disguised
sales of navigable water bottoms in contravention of Article 9, section 3 of the
1974 Louisiana Constitution. The defendant urged that the oyster harvesting
lease conveyed one or more rights inherent only in full ownership fights-i.e.,
the right to maintain an action for damages against any person, partnership,
corporation, or other entity causing wrongful or negligent injury or damage to the
beds or grounds under lease. Rejecting this argument, the court found this right,
granted in Section 423(B) of the Louisiana Oyster Statutes,65 is not a right
unique to full ownership. The court noted the right was no different than that
right granted to a lessee under Louisiana Civil Code article 2703 to sue third
parties for damages.6 The court also noted that other rights enjoyed by oyster
lessees, such as heritability, transferability, the right to place a mortgage on the
lease, and that the leasehold interest may be seized and sold for an obligation
owed by the lessee, could suggest full ownership. However, the reality of a
fixed lease term, fifteen years, without automatic renewal rights gave ample

60.

Id. at i114.
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64.
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519 So. 2d 836 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writs denied, 521 So. 2d 1151, 1152 (1988).
Id. at 839-42.
La. R.S. 31:4 (1989).
Jurisich v. Hopson Marine Serv. Co., 619 So. 2d 1111, 1114 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
La. R.S. 56:423(B) (Supp. 1994).
See Potter v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 615 So. 2d 318 (La. 1993).
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proof that such leases are not full transfers of ownership. Thus, the lease did not
violate the constitutional prohibition."7
Another rejected argument urged by plaintiff was that the oyster harvesting
leases were, in effect, a donation of state property in violation of Article 7,
section 14 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution. The nominal annual rental
payments under the leases, $1.00 or $2.00 per acre per year, provided the factual
basis for this argument. The court noted that where rental payments are nominal,
other obligations imposed by the lease may supply the requisite consideration.
The court stated "serious consideration" does not mean full value, as it does in
the case of a contract of sale. Rather, where leases are concerned, consideration
is serious unless it is truly inconsequential. "In such a case, the presumption is
that the parties did not intend that the trifle named should ever be paid at all, and
the situation is looked upon as being as if no amount had been named.""
Reviewing the obligations imposed on the lessee by Section 430 of the
Louisiana Oyster Statutes,6 9 the court concluded the statutory obligations,
incorporated into oyster harvesting leases by operation of law, were serious in
every sense of the word-not mere trifles. Further, the obligations were imposed
by law, which tended to substantiate that the obligations were not intended to be
ignored. Thus, the court found that in enacting the Louisiana Oyster Statute, and
thereby imposing obligations on the lessee, the legislature must have made a
determination that the obligations were serious in nature and, as such, were
sufficient obligations to supply the requisite consideration for the lease. 0
B. ProperParty Plaintiff
In Jurisich, in reviewing the trial court's denial of the defendant's exception
of failure to join the State of Louisiana as an indispensable party, the court
determined the plaintiffs, as lessees, had no cause of action against the lessor, the
State of Louisiana, for damages caused by a third party. Thus, the court
concluded the plaintiffs, as lessees, were the proper parties to sue for damages
caused by third persons to their valuable property rights in their oyster beds."
XII.

ISSUES ARISING UNDER LOUISIANA REVISED STATUTES 9:3221

A. Proof of Stipulation
In Muse v. Katz,"2 the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal held an
affidavit in support of summary judgment that sets forth only conclusory

67.

Jurisich, 619 So. 2d at 1114-15.
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Id. at 1115 (quoting Murray v. Barnhardt, 117 La. 1023, 1031, 42 So. 489, 491 (1906)).

69.
70.
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La. R.S. 56:430 (Supp. 1994).
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statements that the mover neither "knew, knows, or should have known of any
defect" and that sets forth no facts to establish the basis of the affiant's lack of
knowledge cannot be considered in support of a motion for summary judgment
under Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3221. To be considered, the affidavit must
sufficiently explain whether the lessor should not have known of the defects.
Otherwise, a genuine issue of material fact still exists. 3 Judge Ciaccio, in a
separate concurrence, noted that the reversal of summary judgment because of
the apparent defect in the affidavits was required by fourth circuit precedent.
However, he reiterated the position of two dissenting judges that such a rule
improperly places the burden on the lessor to prove a negative.74
B. Oral Leases and Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3221
In Smith v. Jack Dyer & Associates, Inc.," the Louisiana First Circuit
Court of Appeal opined as to whether a purportedly written Section 9:3221
stipulation may be proved orally. The court concluded the contract contemplated
by Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3221 may be written or oral. However, the
lessor bears "the burden of proving with legal certainty the existence of such a
contract."7 The lessor in Smith failed to carry that burden because the lessee
never acknowledged that the lease agreement which he signed was an exact
duplicate of the copy the appellants maintained he had signed and produced in
court. Further, the lessor failed to prove that the lease agreement signed by the
tenant contained a provision which stipulated that the lessee assumed the
responsibilities under Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3221.
C. Freedom to Contract-Agreeing to a Written Notice Requirement
Regarding Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3221 Defects
In dicta, the Smith court took the opportunity to clarify the type of notice
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3221 requires. The court rejected the appellant's
contention that Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3221 does not specifically prohibit
parties to a lease contract from agreeing that the lessee must provide "written
notice" of any defects in the lease premises to the lessor before any liability will
be shifted back to the lessor. Following Thompson v. Suprena," the first circuit
held that although the lease agreement requires the lessee to notify the lessor in
writing, the pertinent legal inquiry is simply "whether the owner knew or should
have known of the defectiveness. '"" Further, construing the statutory language,

73.
74.
570 (La.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See also Armstrong, supra note 19, § 8.73, at 193-94.
Muse, 632 So. 2d at 850 (Ciaccio, J., concurring) (citing Slaughter v. Coleman, 490 So. 2d
App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 496 So. 2d 327 (1986)).
For a discussion of the facts of Smith, see supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
Smith v. Jack Dyer & Assocs., Inc., 633 So. 2d 694, 697 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993).
65 So. 2d 801 (La. App. On. 1953).
Smith, 633 So. 2d at 698 (quoting Thompson, 65 So. 2d at 803).
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the court held that "notice," not "written notice," is all that Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:3221 requires. 79 Thus, in dicta, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of
Appeal has adopted the position of the Orleans Circuit (Louisiana Fourth and
Fifth Circuits) that a lease which provides for a requirement of written notice by
the lessee to the lessor of a defect in the premises is invalid and will not be
recognized by the courts.
Implicit in the decision of the first circuit is recognition that Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:3221 is an exception to the general rule of Louisiana Civil Code article
200480 forbidding anticipatory exculpation from certain liabilities. The correctness, however, of the Thompson court position should be analyzed in light of the
freedom of contract analysis employed in Daigle v. Clemco Industries.8 , Daigle
recently and strongly reaffirmed the rule of freedom of contract except where there
exists constraints by law or expressions of public policy. 2 The Thompson court
made no such finding. Section 3221 appears to be a legislatively designed means
to promote the availability of affordable leasing space by permitting the lessor and
lessee to bargain for and to agree to the prospective allocation of losses arising from
some premises defects. It is undeniably an expression of public policy. Any
interpretation which makes the operation of Section 3221 unexpectedly onerous for
either party impairs the effectiveness of the legislature's attempt to promote the
availability of affordable leasing space. In fact, a lease requirement mandating
written notice of a premises defect of the type that would give rise to lessor liability
under Section 3221 promotes the purpose of that section. When exercised by the
lessee, it operates to insure receipt of notice of the defect by the lessor. Further, it
does not preclude a courtesy oral notice. An agreement requiring written notice
serves the specific purpose of Section 3221 because a lessor will more likely
correct the defect after receiving written notice. It also serves the increasingly
important general public purpose of reducing potential litigation by avoiding "hard
to prove" oral notice.
XIII. BANKRUPTCY-RELATED ISSUES
A. Debtor'sFailureto Timely Accept or Reject Lease-Effect on Third Parties
The United States Fifth Circuit has recently ruled that
a debtor's inaction in timely deciding to assume or reject a lease of
nonresidential real property under § 365(d)(4) [of the Bankruptcy Code),
which leads to a deemed rejection, does not effect a termination of that

79. Id.
80. See Neal Joseph Kling, Note, Ramirez v. Fair Grounds Corporation: The Harm in Holding
Harmless, 52 La. L. Rev. 1061 (1992).

81.

613 So. 2d 619 (La.1993).

82. See a discussion of Daigle by its author in James L. Dennis, Interpretation andApplication
of the Civil Code and the Evaluation of Judicial Precedent, 54 La. L. Rev. 1 (1993).
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lease, or, consequently, an implied forfeiture of the rights of third
83
parties to the lease.
The Fifth Circuit noted this decision would resolve the "starkly conflicting
opinions" among bankruptcy courts.' As a result of the conclusion, a Chapter
11 debtor, which had granted a pre-petition deed of trust on its tenant-leasehold
interest in a ground lease, retained rights in that lease against the lessor, as a
third party beneficiary of the ground lease, following the deemed rejection of that
lease.
B. Rejection of Lease by Resolution Trust Corporationor the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation
In a decision that suggests proceeding with caution in lease/assumption
rejection cases involving the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) (and by
analogy, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), the United States Second
Circuit Court of Appeals held the RTC has a reasonable period of time in which
to repudiate contracts, including leases, following its appointment as a receiver.85 Th.t reasonable time is to be given to the receiver, even if the RTC had
previously acted as a conservator for the same institution. The court concluded
Congress intended to provide conservators and receivers with independent powers
of repudiation. The court looked to Chapter 3 of the Bankruptcy Code by
analogy, noting that a Chapter 11 trustee would be analogous to a RTC
conservator in that the Chapter 11 trustee eventually might be replaced by a
Chapter 7 trustee which would be analogous to a receiver. Although the Chapter
7 trustee might be appointed after the initial rejection period had lapsed with
respect to the Chapter 11 trustee, the Chapter 7 trustee would enjoy a new period
in which to elect rejection.8"
XIV.

BACK TO BASICS-COVERAGE MUST PRECEDE LIABILITY

As the result in Dufrene v. Duncan87 reminds, the existence of insurance
coverage is always subject to the specific terms and conditions of the policy. In
Dufrene, suit was filed on behalf of a five-year-old who was allegedly bitten by
a dog while in the backyard of neighbors. In addition to suing the lessee
neighbors, Dufrene also sued the lessor and his insurer under a rental dwelling
insurance policy. The trial court found the lessor/owner was not strictly liable
under Louisiana Civil Code article 2317. Nevertheless, the lessees argued the

83. Eastover Bank for Savings v. Sowashee Venture (In re Austin Dev. Co.), 19 F.3d 1077,
1083 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 201 (1994).
84. Id. at 1080.
85.
1185 Ave. of the Ams. Assocs. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 22 F.3d 494 (2d Cir. 1994).
86. Id. at 497-98.
87. 634 So. 2d 19 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994).
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lessor's rental dwelling insurance policy covered the medical expenses of the
injured child regardless of any legal duty of the lessor/owner."9 Distinguishing
Terrebonne v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,89 wherein the Louisiana First
Circuit Court of Appeal held the medical coverage provisions of a homeowner's
policy demonstrate the intent by the insurer to make medical payments without
regard to any duty imposed by law or any legality owed by the insured, the court
noted the circumstances of the claim must still fall within the policy coverage
definitions. 9" The particular policy provision provides:
We will pay the necessary medical expenses incurred or medically
ascertained within three years from the date of an accident causing
bodily injury which arises out of a condition on the insured premises
or for which the 9insured is provided bodily Injury liability coverage
under the policy. 1
The court held that based on Civil Code articles controlling contract interpretation,
injuries from dogs owned by the lessees who reside on the premises do
not arise "out of a condition on the insured premises"; that is, the dogs
are not a "condition on the insured premises." The purpose of this
rental dwelling insurance was to protect against liability for medical
payments for an injury arising from a condition of the rental dwelling
or property as distinguished from an injury arising from pets kept on the
premises by the tenants.92
Reasoning that any bodily injury that may have occurred did not arise out of a
premises defect, the court affirmed the decision that the insurer was not required
to provide coverage for the medical expenses incurred by the injured child.
XV. EXPROPRIATION ISSUES
A. Tenant Losses Beyond Term of Lease
InPackard'sWestern Store, Inc. v. State,9" Packard's Western Store, Inc.
(Packard's), a lessee, brought suit seeking constitutional compensation for the
taking of its leasehold interest under Louisiana Constitution Article 1, section 4.
Packard's also urged a novel separate theory of recovery of damages for losses
that allegedly arose from the State's negligent actions prior to the taking.
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89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 20-21.
491 So. 2d 73 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
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618 So. 2d 1166 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 629 So. 2d 345 (1993).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

Packard's alleged the state rescinded its offer to "buy the business," delayed
property acquisition for several years, told Packard's not to move until the
property was acquired from the landowner, offered little assistance to locate a
replacement site, and told Packard's it could recover no more than $10,000 for
its losses.94
Regarding the novel second theory of recovery, damages caused by
Packard's relying on the representations made by the State, the trial court
instructed the jury that to prevail on this theory Packard's had to prove (1)the
State was negligent or did not use reasonable care in making representations to
Packard's; (2) Packard's relied to its detriment upon the representations made by
the State; and (3) Packard's was reasonable in its reliance on the representations
made by the State. The trial court further instructed the jury that "[iin order to
determine if a party has been 'reasonable' in their actions, you should consider
whether they have acted as an ordinary prudent person would have acted under
the circumstances."95
The State objected to the references to tort recovery in the jury charge and
on the verdict form on the grounds that the only basis for recovery was under the
constitutional and statutory law applicable to expropriation. That objection was
overruled. On appeal, the State repeated the same arguments concerning the jury
charge verdict form. Further, for the first time on appeal, the State argued the
testimony relating to the State's actions prior to the expropriation was irrelevant.
Regarding this latter objection, the court rejected the argument because the State
did not make a timely objection to this testimony in the trial court. Further, the
court concluded it need not and would not squarely answer whether the trial
court erred when it instructed the jury that recovery for the State's negligence
was a proper alternative to the right of constitutional compensation.96 Because
the trial court correctly charged the jury on Packard's right to compensation and
the measure of the compensation under the state constitution, the second theory
of recovery was deemed unnecessary to the decision on appeal.
The court also rendered several important and ground-breaking rulings
regarding permissible expropriation damages for lessees. It held that the right
to and the scope of constitutional compensation for damages allowable to a
lessee are broad enough to encompass Packard's claim that the value of its
business and its business profits were damaged by the State's actions before the
taking, notwithstanding the State's assertions that the State took only the
shopping center in which Packard's store is located and not Packard's business.97 The court further noted the constitutional measure of recovery (full
extent of the loss) is broader than the measure of tort recovery for negligent
conduct, which is limited to actual and reasonably foreseeable damages. 98 The

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

I 168-70.
1171.
1171-72.
1175-76.
1172..

19951

LEASE LAW

court concluded the jury awards of loss of future profits and loss of leasehold
advantage represented losses compensable under the Constitution if they can be
shown to be causally related to the State's taking or damaging of the property."
Regarding one particular element of damages, the court examined the State's
appeal of the award of $70,000 in lost or future profits, some of which extended
beyond the time period in which Packard's last lease at the shopping center
would have expired. The State contended that a business lessee may not legally
recover business losses beyond the end of its lease term. The trial court had
instructed the jury "that losses beyond a lease term could be awarded if
Packard's 'has proved by preponderance of the evidence that it had an option or
The court, in affirmguarantee that [its] lease would have been renewed.""
ing the award for loss of future profits, refused to say "a lessee may never
recover business losses beyond the expiration of the lease term, particularly
when, as here, the impending expropriation is found to be the sole reason for
shortening what would otherwise have been a. longer lease term in a wellestablished and mutually satisfactory lessor-lessee relationship."''
Thus, the
court found no error in the jury charge that Packard's could recover business
losses after the expiration of its lease upon proof by preponderance of the
evidence that Packard's had an option or reasonable expectation that its lease
would have been renewed for some reasonable time.
The court, however, did overturn a jury award for $79,167 for loss of
leasehold advantage.
"A lessee enjoys a leasehold advantage when its
contractual rent is less than what the property would bring on the rental market
at the time of the taking."' ' The court found that because Packard's did not
relocate, it did not incur any losses by paying a higher rent. Thus, the court
overturned the jury award for loss of leasehold advantage. The court also
rejected the right to recover for loss of fixtures and improvements made to the
leasehold where under the lease Packard's was obligated to surrender such
fixtures and improvements to the owner of the leasehold at the termination of the
lease.' 03
Agreeing with Packard'sWestern Store, Inc., in principle, a number of other
cases have analyzed lessee claims for recovery of "business losses after the
expiration of its lease on proof by preponderance of evidence that [lessee] had
an option or reasonable expectation that its lease would have been renewed for
some reasonable time period."'"

99. Id.
100. Id. at 1173.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1176 (citing Soma Enters. v. State, 584 So. 2d 1243 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied,
589 So. 2d 1055 (1991)).
103. Id. at 1176-77.
104. Red River Waterway Comm'n v. Fry, 628 So. 2d 38 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993), writ denied,
633 So. 2d 581 (1994): State v. Morein, 628 So. 2d 1191 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993). 'See also State
v. Sanders, 628 So. 2d 1207 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993).
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B. Double Compensation for Farm Allotments
In a recent case, the fair market value paid for land in an expropriation
proceeding reflected the future stream of income from the expropriated property,
including a federal farm allotment. However, although the lessee retained the
allotment, he was also awarded the full value of the land including future loss
of profits from use of the allotment. The court concluded to permit that result
to stand would impermissibly result in a windfall double recovery.105
C. Relocation Assistance
In Packard'sWestern Store, Inc., the State contended that "in lieu of" actual
6
expenses awards under the Louisiana Uniform Relocation Assistance Act'0
(URAA) duplicated the business loss damages awards made to Packard's. The
court examined the URAA to determine whether the payment in lieu of moving
expenses duplicated the other awards. The court noted Section 3104(A) required
the State to pay "actual expenses" to a displaced business owner for three types
of expenses: "1) actual and reasonable moving expenses; 2) actual direct losses
of tangible personal property as a result of moving or discontinuing a business
.operation, not exceeding the reasonable expense to relocate the property; and 3)
actual reasonable expenses in searching for a replacement site. '' 7 Section
3104(C) of the URAA provides that the State may pay a displaced person who
elects to accept the payment authorized by Section 3104(C) in lieu of the
payments authorized by Section 3104(A). That payment was established as "a
fixed relocation payment in an amount equal to the average annual net earnings
of the business or farm operation, but not less than [$2,500] nor more than
[$10,000. ' ' The court concluded that "the fact that the amount of the 'in
lieu of payment is based on the business's annual net earnings, nor that the
business owner must show loss of patronage to be eligible for the 'in lieu of
payment, requires that the 'in lieu of'award be credited against Packard's awards
for lost earnings or lost value of the business."' 9 The court further concluded
that because an "in lieu of" actual expenses payment compensates for amounts
expended in searching for a new location and advertising expenses, these
damages were different and distinct from an award for lost profits, and the lessee
was not required by Section 3104(C) to prove the extent of these losses. Thus,

105. Red River Waterway Comm'n v. Waddle, 631 So. 2d 1266, 1278 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 635 So. 2d 1114 (1994).
106. La. R.S. 38:3101-:3110 (1989).
107. Packard's W. Store, Inc. v. State, 618 So. 2d 1166. 1177 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied,
629 So. 2d 345 (1993).
108. Id. at 1178.
109. Id.
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the court concluded the damage award under URAA did not duplicate business
loss awards."
XVI. LEASE DEPOSITS

A. Application of Louisiana Deposit Statute to Terminated Lease
Louisiana's specific statute concerning the return of the lessee's deposit upon
termination of the lease, Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3251, does not apply
where the lease has been rescinded."' The court noted in Mayeaux v.
Christakis" 2 that Mr. Mayeaux had never received possession of the key to the
apartment nor did he have a copy of the written lease agreement. Furthermore,
the court held the lease was mutually rescinded by the lessor and the lessee and
shortly thereafter a second lease was entered into with a new tenant. Thus, the
court concluded the lease was rescinded rather than terminated and therefore
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3251-:3253, which are deemed to be penal in nature
and to be strictly construed, were inapplicable. As a result, the court set aside
the trial court awards of statutory damages under Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:3251, travel expenses for out of town witnesses, and attorney's fees, and
affirmed that part of the judgment requiring the lessor to return the $1,100
deposit and first month's rent to the lesseeY"
B. Deposit of Rent into Court Registry as Payment
Pretermitting a question of first impression, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeal declined to decide whether the deposit of back rent into the
registry of the court satisfied the requirement to -pay rent. Because the deposit
into the registry of the court was not timely under the terms of the lease, the
court pretermitted the question." 4
C. Insurance Company Receivership Statutes and Lease Deposits
In Dixon v. Fidelity Fire & Casualty Insurance Co.,"' the court applied
Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:757-part of the Louisiana Insurance Code-to
determine the disposition of a lease deposit placed by an insurance-company in
receivership. In Dixon, the lease provided an escrow agreement under which the

110. td.
111. Mayeaux v. Christakis, 619 So. 2d 93 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1993). See also Yardumian v.
Beals, 341 So. 2d 626 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
112. 619 So. 2d 93 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1993).
113. Id. at 96-97.
114. Board of Comm'rs v. Turner Marine Bulk, Inc., 629 So. 2d 1278 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993),
writ denied, 634 So. 2d 392 (1994).
115. 633 So. 2d 888 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994).
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lessee would make a deposit of $200,000 to a bank to secure its performance of
payment of rent under the lease. After the first year, the amount of the deposit
would be reduced to $100,000. The lease provided the rent was due in advance on
the first day of the month and if the lessee failed to pay the rent at that time, it was
in default. The lessee would then be entitled to request payment from the funds
held by the bank. The lessor further agreed under the lease to provide the lessee
with notice of its intent to request payment from the bank. Finally, the lease
provided the lessor was entitled to request payment of the entire amount in escrow
at such time when it was required to provide written notice to the lessee for the
third time. The rent was late for the months of August, September, and October of
1991, and the lessor gave notice to the lessee for those three months. However, in
June of 1991, the lessee, an insurance company, was placed into conservatorship,
and in September of 1991 placed into liquidation. The rent, nevertheless, was paid
on behalf of the insurance company-lessee through March, 1992.'16
The issue in the case was whether the lessor was entitled to claim the escrow
funds at the bank because of the three prior late rent notices and notices of intent
to make a claim for back rent from the bank. The Commissioner of Insurance, as
liquidator of the insurance company-lessee, argued the escrow fund should become
part of the general assets of the insurance company because the lessor did not have
a "secured claim" on the date of liquidation. The lessor argued that under
Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:757(11), which mentions "deposit as security" and
"escrow," it did have a secured claim. In further support of its interpretation of the
statute, the lessor urged that any portion of its claim in excess of the escrow funds
would be an unsecured, general obligation of the insolvent insurer. The court, in
reliance on Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:757(11), concluded there were no
grounds for treating the lessor as anything other than a secured creditor to the extent
of the deposit."'
XVII. UNUSUAL PROPOSIONS
A. Compensation of Lessee is Matter Between Lessor andLessee
In a novel, but unavailing argument, an expropriating body argued the
Louisiana Civil Code relegated the matter of tenant compensation to the lessor and
lessee, and not the taker. In Red River Waterway Commission v. Fry,' 8 the
Commission contended that Louisiana Civil Code article 2697 made the issue of
expropriation damages an issue between the lessor and lessee and not between the
lessee and the expropriating authority." 9 Granting that Article 2697 and the
appropriate circumstances may bar a lessee's damage claim against the lessor, the
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second circuit concluded the lessee's claim against the expropriating body for
constitutionally mandated "just compensation" for the taking was not barred. The
court concluded that a lessee does not give up his right to claim constitutional
compensation for the taking by agreeing to a self-destruct lease provision that
merely restates the law contained in Article 2697. Thus, the court maintained the
right of the lessee to pursue the Commission for damages caused by expropriation." o
B. Recusal of Judges Who "Are or Have Been Landlords"
In Mayeaux v. Christakis,in their application for rehearing, the appellees
sought to have "all judges of the Fifth Circuit who are landlords, or, former
attorneys for landlords recuse themselves from this case.''. Citing Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure article 160 and the Uniform Rules for Louisiana Courts of
Appeal, the court noted that a written motion was required to seek recusal ofjudges
and that a brief in support of the request for recusal is required by the Uniform
Rules. The court further noted there had been neither a written motion nor a brief
filed on the question of recusal. Moreover, the court noted the Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure articles on recusation envision the filing of such a motion prior to
trial or immediately after the facts constitute the invalid ground for recusal or
discovery. Thus, the court concluded the appellee's "motion" for recusal was
untimely filed since it was filed after the case was submitted and was not based on
facts newly discovered. Thus, without determining whether the allegations
underlying the motion for recusal were sufficient to provide a valid basis for
recusal, the court noted the appellee did not raise any factual allegations upon
which to base the recusal which were unknown to him at the time of oral argument.
And thus the court denied a rehearing and the "motion" for recusal.' 22
C. Eviction as a Disturbance ofPossession
In an action that garnered the imposition of sanctions under Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure article 863, a tenant evicted by a city court judgment filed suit in
district court seeking to enjoin the execution of the city court judgment. The tenant
argued the eviction suit filed in city court was a disturbance of possession of the
lessee within the meaning of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3663.23
Citing the exception in Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3659, the court
found this argument to be completely without merit because an eviction proceeding
is "an action or proceeding, adverse [I to the possessor of such property or

120. Red River Waterway Comm'n, 628 So. 2d at 41.
121. Mayeaux v. Christakis, 619 So. 2d 93, 98 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1993) (denying appellees'
application for rehearing).
122. Id.
123. Jackson v. Campco of Monroe, Inc., 623 So. 2d 1380 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993).
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right."' 24 Concluding that an eviction proceeding was simply not a "disturbance"
which served as a basis for a possessory action, the Jackson court affirmed the
award of sanctions against the attorney for filing the action in district court to
enjoin the judgment of the city court.
XVIII. MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS

A. Assignment of Lease-FormRequirements
An assignment of a lease from a succession, although the assignment is not
notarized and does not have the signature of two witnesses, is valid because the
Louisiana Civil Code contains no formal requirements that an assignment be in
authentic form. Therefore, if otherwise valid, such an assignment gives the
assignee the right of action to collect past due rent from the tenant.'25
B. Venue for Suit on Lease of Immovable
An action on a lease of immovable property may be brought in the parish in
which the contract was executed, although the property is located in another
26
parish.1
C. ReconductionofAgriculturalLeases
An agricultural lease cannot reconduct, and the Louisiana Civil Code articles
concerning reconduction are inapplicable, when either party has announced his
intention not to renew the lease on the same terms for a full year. Where
negotiations involve terms which differ substantially from the primary lease, even
where there is no formal demand to vacate the premises, such negotiations clearly
evidence an intent not to continue the same terms of the lease. Therefore, the lease
will not be continued through reconduction 2 7 Davis v. Alsup apparently had no
cause to consider the rarely explored nature of the relationship between a former
lessor and former lessee when the lessee continues to remain in possession of the
leased premises after the negotiations for the new lease fail and the lease has
terminated.
D. Lessor'sStatutory Obligationto Mitigate Damages
In 1993, the Louisiana Legislature enacted Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:3260. Section 3260 provides that:
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125.
126.
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127.

Id. at 1383.
Meyer v. Ullo, 627 So. 2d 226 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
Sutton Steel & Supply, Inc. v. Southland Steel & Supply, Inc., 640 So. 2d 639 (La. App.
(citing La. Code Civ. P. art. 76.1), writ denied, 642 So. 2d 199 (1994).
Davis v. Alsup, 627 So. 2d 775 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993).
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When a lessee or tenant of commercial, residential, or dwelling
premises has been constructively evicted from the premises, and when
the premises are rendered uninhabitable through no fault of the lessee
or tenant,28 the landlord or lessor shall be required to mitigate his
damages.1
Whether this statute alters or adds to the traditional obligations to mitigate
damages129 remains to be seen.
E. Option to Purchasethe Leased Premises
In Baro Controls, Inc. v. Prejean,'30 for an additional consideration of
$10,000 the lessee purchased a concurrent option to purchase the leased premises
for a fixed price. The option had to be exercised on or before September 1,
1988. Further, the agreement provided if the lessee failed to timely exercise the
option, the $10,000 would be forfeited. Additionally, forfeiture could result from
violation of any term or condition of the lease, from termination of the lease for
any reason, or from a failure to purchase the property as provided under the
option to purchase agreement. The deadline for exercising the option passed
without any action by the lessee. Furthermore, the lessee continued to remain
in the leased premises and failed to pay rent after the term of the lease
expired.3 '
After several attempts to renegotiate the purchase price of the property, Baro
filed a rule to evict. The lessee filed a reconventional demand seeking the return
of the $10,000 option price alleging defects in the property. The court rejected
the lessee's claim that his consent was vitiated because of an alleged defect in
the premises, a rotten beam, and held that under the unambiguous language of
the option agreement the lessee had until September 1, 1988 to exercise the
option or forfeit the option right and the $10,000 option premium. When the
lessee failed to notify Baro on or before that date, the forfeiture took effect.
Therefore, Baro was entitled to keep the $10,000 without applying it to any sales
price. 132
F. Sublessee's Claim of Unjust Enrichment
On rehearing in Edwards v. Conforto,'3 the Louisiana Supreme Court held
neither unjust enrichment nor any other legal theory supports favoring the right
of a lessee to recover insurance proceeds paid to the lessor where clear
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contractual provisions dictate the contrary. Under the lease and a sublease, the
lessee and the sublessees were responsible for repair of all fire damage to the
leased premises (absent complete destruction in which lessee and the sublessee
had the option to cancel the lease), to pay insurance premiums, and to furnish
$50,000 of fire insurance with the lessor as the sole recipient (loss payee). Thus,
in the event of fire, the court held the lessor was not unjustly enriched when he
received insurance proceeds for damages the lessee or sublessee had to repair
because there was no absence of justification or cause for enrichment to the

lessor. 134
The court also concluded the defense of equitable estoppel could not be
raised against the lessor because that defense required a showing of a representation by conduct or words, justifiable reliance, and a change in position to the
detriment of the person because of that reliance. The only reliance the sublessee
could demonstrate was its act of repairing the fire damaged premises and that act
was a fulfillment of a contractual obligation imposed by the sublease on the
sublessee. 135 Thus, neither36 unjust enrichment nor equitable estoppel operated
in favor of the sublessee.
G. OralModification of Leases
Baro Controls,Inc. v. Prejeanheld that where a lease agreement specified
that any modifications must both be in writing and signed by both parties, the
lessor was not entitled to collect past due rent under a written modification to the
original lease where it was tendered to, but not signed by, the lessee. The court
so concluded despite testimony that the lessee verbally agreed with the
modification which had been tendered to her. Apparently there had been no
performance by the lessee of the new "agreement." The court focused on the
lease specification that any modifications to the lease must be in writing and
signed by both parties. Therefore, because the lessee never signed the
modifications, the new rentals never went into effect and could not be enforced. 3'
In another recent case, a written lease contained a provision that the tenant
could not sublease. That provision notwithstanding, the lessee testified he never
occupied the premises, he immediately subleased the property to a third person,
and the third person occupied the premises for a period of two years. Further,
testimony revealed the sublessee paid rent to the lessor and the lessor knew the
occupant was not the lessee."' Concluding, apparently, that there was an oral
modification of the written lease which waived the written subleasing interdic-
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tion, the court concluded the lessee's act of subleasing was not a breach of the
lease contract. The court observed that the right of the lessor to reject subleases
by his lessee can be waived and such waiver can be written, oral, or implied
from actions by the lessor.

